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CALMING UNSETTLED WATERS: A PROPOSAL
FOR NAVIGATING THE TENUOUS POWER DIVIDE
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE USPTO
UNDER THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT
William Rose*

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. system of patent law has a history of fluidity and uncertainty. This has
been especially true over the past several decades as Congress, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the federal courts have had to grapple with the
legal and policy challenges presented by the astonishing rate of technological development and the skyrocketing value of patents.1 The information-age technology boom
dramatically increased the volume of patent applications, resulting in a major backlog
at the USPTO.2 This backlog has led to hurried review of patent applications and the
issuance of a large number of low-quality patents.3 The deeper patent pool in turn stimulated the rise of patents as an offensive and defensive tool for businesses, which currently contributes to the already overcrowded federal court dockets.4
* I would like to thank my Note Editor Emilie Whitehurst for her feedback and assistance
throughout the writing process and the Volume 22 Editorial Staff for selecting and preparing this
Note for publication. I would also like to thank Professor Laura Heymann and Professor Kristen
Osenga for providing insight that ultimately led me to write on this topic.
1
See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: LITIGATION
CONTINUES TO RISE AMID GROWING AWARENESS OF PATENT VALUE (2012) [hereinafter 2012
PATENT LITIGATION STUDY], available at http://www.pwc.com/en_us/us/forensic-services
/publications/assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf; Petr Hanel, Intellectual Property Rights
Business Management Practices: A Survey of the Literature, 26 TECHNOVATION 895, 896–98,
917–21 (2007) (discussing legal and policy changes that encouraged growth in patent applications and various methods of valuing intellectual property rights); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving
Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 140 (2000)
(attributing the increase in patent volume to an emerging understanding among businesses that
intellectual property rights are the key to modern corporate strategy).
2
See generally Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological
Revolution: What is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?, 48 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF.
SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 247, 289–90 (1998) (asserting that the increase in patent volume is a
direct result of a massive increase in research productivity and innovation, not “friendly” courts).
3
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING
ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 4 (2010) [hereinafter PATENT REFORM:
DEP’T OF COMMERCE WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/migrated/Patent_Reform-paper.pdf.
4
See generally Lemley, supra note 1, at 142–43 (discussing the emergence of tactical patent
use by competing businesses).
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However, the patent litigation explosion has also rendered far more subtle and insidious effects. The volume of cases and the pace of changing technology led courts to
hand down decisions that are imprecise and difficult to resolve. In other words, the
flood of patent cases has resulted in a vexingly shifting and incongruous doctrinal
framework.5 The uncertainty created by the shaky doctrine, combined with the prospect
of massive monetary damages awards, creates a positive feedback loop that continually
fuels litigious behavior among patent holders.6 The net result of these developments is
increased costs of obtaining and defending patents, uncertain patent rights, and an embarrassingly protracted delay in both the issuance of patents and the resolution of patent
disputes.7 Many prominent figures even consider the current patent system to be broken, as this expense, uncertainty, and delay stifle the incentive to invent.8
These deleterious effects spurred Congress to pass the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act9 (AIA), which went into full effect on March 16, 2013. The major goals
of the AIA are to increase the speed of patent application processing and dispute resolution, as well as to improve the overall quality of the patent pool.10 To accomplish
these goals, the law provides the USPTO with increased funding, broad post-grant
review powers, and sweeping new rulemaking authority.11 In strengthening the USPTO,
Congress is betting that the office can improve patent quality by ridding the current
patent pool of “bad” patents12 and preventing the issuance of such patents in the first
place.13 Likewise, Congress hopes that the USPTO’s new review powers will provide
a faster and cheaper alternative to litigation, and that the USPTO’s broad rulemaking
authority will contribute to greater doctrinal certainty.14 Thus, in theory, a better funded
5

See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 22–29 (2009).
6
That is, so long as patent value keeps rising via indicia such as damages awards, patent
case filings will continue to increase, patent doctrine will never solidify, and this opacity will
translate into yet more litigation, thus closing the loop. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping
in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001)
(discussing disparate patent doctrine among district courts).
7
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 22–29.
8
Id.
9
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
10
Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 626 (2012).
11
America Invents Act §§ 6–7, 10, 18. Section 10 concerns funding, and sections 6, 7, and
18 cover post-grant review and associated rulemaking powers. These provisions are further
discussed throughout this Note.
12
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 1–10. The authors decry the proliferation of poorly
written patents and patents for “silly” inventions. Id. This Note refers generally to these sorts of
patents as “bad” or “low-quality” patents.
13
See PATENT REFORM: DEP’T OF COMMERCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing
post-grant review policies and predicting that between one-third and one-half of reviews will
result in an invalidity decision).
14
Id.
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and more powerful USPTO can extinguish the current positive feedback problem in
the patent system.15 The resulting improvement in patent quality and doctrinal clarity,
as well as the availability of a cheaper and faster alternative to litigation, will reduce
the time and monetary costs of patent acquisition thereby strengthening the patent right
and reinforcing the incentive to invent.
However, the AIA’s expansion of USPTO power is not without concern. A major
source of uncertainty that has plagued the patent system is the tenuous power divide
between the USPTO and the Article III courts in administering that system.16 Traditionally, the federal courts have taken the lead role in shaping substantive patent doctrine
and deciding matters of infringement and invalidity.17 However, the USPTO has
steadily taken on more quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative roles over the past few
decades.18 This proliferation of non-executive activity in the USPTO creates an uncertain boundary with the coordinate branches of government, even fomenting discussion
that current USPTO practice violates separation of powers principles.19 The AIA seeks
to alleviate this controversy by strengthening the USPTO and crystalizing this power
divide.20 But rather than resolving the separation of powers issue, the AIA brings it into
the spotlight. Currently, the major separation of powers concern is the USPTO’s reexamination authority, where it may declare a previously issued patent invalid even if that
patent survived analogous validity challenges in federal courts.21 The AIA does away
with reexamination proceedings, but it replaces them with much broader review proceedings: post-grant review and inter partes review.22 Additionally, the AIA grants the
15

See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 23–25 (explaining the tendency of the overburdened
USPTO review process to make errors in favor of issuing bad patents).
16
See Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
831, 843–54 (2012) (arguing that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has crafted a
confusing power divide between the courts and the USPTO and has not provided a satisfactory
rationale for this divide).
17
E.g., Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that
the USPTO does not have the authority to create or interpret substantive standards of patentability and patent eligibility).
18
See, e.g., Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1965, 1973 (2009) (discussing the USPTO’s push to have administrative law principles
govern patent law); Tran, supra note 10, at 620; Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric
Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 382–83 (2011)
(asserting that the USPTO has influenced substantive patentability standards despite the ban on
substantive rulemaking by the office).
19
See, e.g., In re Baxter Int’l, 678 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting);
In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting).
20
Dana Robert Colarulli, The America Invents Act of 2011: What It Means for USPTO and
the Challenge Ahead, USPTO (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/9-29
-11_colaruli-presentation.pdf. Slide four explicitly mentions that one goal of the AIA is to
increase certainty in the law. Id.
21
See, e.g., In re Baxter Int’l, 678 F.3d at 1366 (Newman, J., dissenting); In re Constr.
Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1257 (Newman, J., dissenting).
22
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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USPTO unprecedented rulemaking authority regarding these new systems of review.23
Thus, to some commentators, the expansive post-issuance review framework contemplated by the AIA represents an unconstitutional usurpation of the authority of Article
III courts.24 More pressing than the constitutional concern, these commentators further
assert this erosion will have a pernicious effect on the patent system and the incentive
to invent.25
Despite its laudable goals, the AIA poses major challenges regarding its own implementation and administration. Via both major overhauls26 and minor tweaks,27 the AIA
embodies the most sweeping change to patent law in over fifty years.28 In fact, USPTO
Director David Kappos, a strong supporter of the AIA, calls it “the most significant
overhaul to our patent system, since the founding fathers first conceived of codifying
a grand bargain between society and invention.”29 Thus, even if the AIA achieves longterm clarity, the immediate effects will likely be increased confusion and litigation. A
major source of initial controversy will be the proper role and function of the USPTO,
as the dramatic expansion of USPTO authority seemingly encroaches on the traditional
domain of the federal courts.30
This Note explores the constitutional and prudential implications of the USPTO’s
new powers and proposes an approach for judicial review of USPTO decisions under
the AIA. Part I discusses the current patent system and its attending controversies, as
well as specific provisions of the AIA that expand USPTO authority. With that foundation in place, Part II analyzes the myriad concerns surrounding the USPTO’s new
powers. Despite compelling prudential and constitutional concerns, the analysis concedes that the post-grant and inter partes review provisions of the AIA should survive
23

Id. § 18(d)(2) (giving the USPTO power to define what qualifies as a “technological
invention” exempt from the post-grant review of business method patents).
24
See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper & Vincent J. Colatriano, An Attack on Separation of Powers
and Federal Judicial Power? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Section 18 of the America
Invents Act, 13 ENGAGE 49, 50 (2012); Letter from Richard A. Epstein, Professor, N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law and F. Scott Kieff, Professor, George Washington Univ. Sch. of Law, to the House
Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/57945172/Letter-from
-Richard-Epstein-and-F-Scott-Kieff.
25
See, e.g., Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 24, at 52–53 (decrying the effect on finality of
judgment); Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24 (noting that sections of the AIA “will transform the
operation of the patent system for the worse”).
26
See America Invents Act § 3. This section changes the patent entitlement from first to invent to first to file. Id.
27
See generally America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). For example, the AIA only slightly changes the definition of prior art, most notably by removing
geographical limitations for all forms of prior art. Id. § 3(b)(1).
28
The last major piece of patent legislation was the Patent Act of 1952. Pub. L. No. 66-593,
66 Stat. 792 (1952).
29
David Kappos, Re-Inventing the U.S. Patent System, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG FROM
USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:45 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry
/re_inventing_the_us_patent.
30
Tran, supra note 10, at 611.
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a separation of powers challenge. The focus then switches to the role that the courts can
play in shaping the contours and bounds of the USPTO’s new powers.
Part III proposes an approach to judicial review of USPTO decisions that will provide a needed check on the USPTO’s substantive rulemaking authority under the AIA.
Specifically, when deciding challenges to rules promulgated by the USPTO, courts
should strike down any rule that produces substantive effects that are “sufficiently
grave.”31 This approach ensures proper separation of powers by strictly vetting any
challenged USPTO decision for indicia of substantive rulemaking.32 Furthermore, this
approach comports with the important policy objectives of the AIA, as the benefits of
a firm check on USPTO authority circulate to all stakeholders in the patent system,
including the USPTO.
I. THE POLICY OF PATENT LAW, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUE,
AND THE POWER SHIFT TO THE USPTO
Proper treatment of this issue first requires some understanding of the current system of patent law, its sources of tension, and the provisions of the AIA that bear directly
on these tensions. This necessary foundation is provided below. Part A lays out the
foundational aspects of patent law that are germane to this discussion, as these principles are central to any consideration of patent-law policy. Specifically, Part A concerns
the power structure of the patent system and the dynamic incentives at the heart of the
system. Part B presents the current controversy surrounding the division of power
between the USPTO and the federal courts through the context of patent reexamination
proceedings. Part C examines the AIA provisions that replace reexamination proceedings and generally expand USPTO authority. With this backdrop in place, one can
appreciate how the AIA exacerbates preexisting tensions by greatly expanding the rulemaking, rule-interpreting, and dispute-resolution functions of the USPTO.
A. Patent Law’s Shaky Foundation
The recent passage of the AIA, combined with the steady rise in high stakes patent
litigation,33 has put the U.S. patent system in the spotlight perhaps more than ever
31

Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting JEM Broad. Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted)).
32
See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (2011) (supporting the current procedural-substantive test for USPTO
rulemaking).
33
See 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1; see also, e.g., Connie Guglielmo,
Apple, Samsung Debate Royalties as Judge in Patent Dispute Pushes Settlement, Urges “Horse
Trading,” FORBES (Aug. 16, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo
/2012/08/16/apple-samsung-debate-royalties-as-judge-in-patent-dispute-pushes-settlement-urges
-horse-trading-live-blog/ (reporting testimony of an expert witness claiming Samsung owed
Apple up to $207 billion over copied designs).
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before. This focus is well-warranted, as the Founding Fathers recognized that a welldevised, well-defined, and well-executed system of granting limited monopolies is critical to the welfare of the nation.34 The ultimate goal of such a system is to incentivize
invention,35 disclosure,36 and innovation,37 thus advancing the nation’s interests by ensuring favorable social and economic conditions domestically as well as bolstering the
country’s renown and prestige on the world stage. The following discussion describes
the incentives that underlie patent policy, the division of power between the federal
courts and the USPTO, and how these concepts are critically related.
At the heart of the patent system is the balancing of ex ante and ex post incentives.38
The goal is to grant the inventor a sufficiently strong property right so as to encourage
and reward his or her inventive effort while leaving the door open for future innovation
by others.39 Related to this is the truism that the public benefits greatly from disclosure
and dissemination of ideas.40 Although granting an inventor a limited monopoly in the
form of a patent may cause problems such as reduced output and pricing above marginal cost, there would be no inventive activity in the first place without the right to
exclude others from practicing the invention.41 This is because invention involves high
34

See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. President, to Oliver Evans, American inventor
(May 2, 1807), in 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 76 (H.A. Washington ed., 1853) (stating
that “ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement”).
35
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) (stating that a foundational principle of patent law
is to allow inventors to internalize the positive economic benefits of their expenditures on
research and development).
36
See Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028 (1989) (discussing the proposition that a chief
function of a patent system is to encourage disclosure because disclosure is crucial to future inventions and to the general public, but is only possible if the inventor receives a property right
in exchange for this disclosure).
37
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1661 (2003) (stating that the incentive to innovate is distinct from the incentive to invent and
involves “turning an idea into a finished product”).
38
See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127 (2004); see also Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989,
1043 (1997).
39
See SCOTCHMER, supra note 38, at 127; Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the
Allocation of Resources for Invention, RAND CORP. (1959), available at http://www.rand.org
/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P1856.pdf (arguing that information is a primary yield of
invention and disclosure).
40
See Arrow, supra note 39 (discussing the tremendous value to the public in disclosing
innovations, but acknowledging that uncompensated disclosure can weaken the incentive for
inventive activity absent a strong property-right protection). This fundamental problem is commonly known as “Arrow’s Information Paradox.” See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Software
Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1610 (2007).
41
E.g., Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J.
ECON. PERSP. 57, 57–58 (2005).
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upfront or fixed costs in the form of research and development. By conferring the right
to exclude others from practicing the invention, patents allow the inventor to monetize
the invention and recoup these fixed costs. In exchange, the patentee must provide an
enabling disclosure of the invention in the patent42 and must accept a limited patent
term.43 By contrast, without this right others would be free to copy the invention without incurring any fixed costs, effectively usurping the market from the inventor and
depriving him or her of the chance to recover their own fixed costs of inventing.44 With
no hope of capturing these costs in the marketplace, there is virtually no incentive to
invent, and the public would miss out on the benefits of incremental gains in science
and technology.45 However, excessively strong patent protection also harms the public,
as it enables rent-seeking behavior by patentees and stymies the enrichment of the
public domain.46
Thus, the patent right involves a balancing of interests between current inventors,
future inventors, and the general public. Effectively striking this balance requires a welldevised legal framework that is clearly and reliably enforced. This clarity allows inventors to better analyze the possibility and efficacy of obtaining patent protection, thereby
incentivizing innovation and inuring the benefit of society. Clear patent rights also enable future inventors and members of the public to more accurately discern what they
can and cannot do regarding patented technology. This should reduce instances of infringement, and of course infringement lawsuits, which in turn should allow the public
greater freedom to operate.
One way to accomplish this clarity is through the preferential use of explicit rules
rather than standards.47 On its face, a “rule-heavy” system seems ideal for this task,
as the chief virtue of such a system is its explicit delineation. However, patent law
better lends itself to a “standards-heavy” approach. This owes primarily to the inherently unpredictable nature of technological development.48 Adopting an inflexible
42

See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006) (requiring “enablement”).
See § 154(a)(2).
44
See Posner, supra note 41, at 72. The free-rider would still incur some fixed costs, but they
are negligible compared to the fixed costs of invention. Id.
45
See id. at 58–59.
46
See generally Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property
Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate
Information, and the Alternative of a Government Run System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998) (discussing the perverse incentives that result from the temporary monopoly given to patent holders).
47
See, e.g., Mindgames Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner,
J.) (“Rules have the advantage of being definite and of limiting factual inquiry but the disadvantage of being inflexible, even arbitrary and thus overinclusive . . . . Standards are flexible,
but vague and open-ended; they make business planning difficult . . . and are more costly
to adjudicate . . . .”).
48
See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards at the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 609, 611 (2009); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90
B.U. L. REV. 51, 90 (2010).
43
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rule-based approach could suppress future inventive activity and, in a worst-case
scenario, preclude and extinguish entire fields of potential innovation.49 This fear is
reflected in the fact that the common law surrounding patents has spawned a shifting
system of standards, rather than bright-line rules.50 Judges recognize that the law simply
cannot comprehend the technical advances of the future and that standards provide the
necessary flexibility and growing room to foster future innovation.51 Patent law is thus
vexing in that inventors and the public would, at least in the short term, seem to benefit
from more explicit rules and decisions. However, flexible standards play a key role in
patent law, and the pace of technology places an even greater premium on flexibility.
This tension is at the heart of the shifting power divide between the USPTO and the
courts. The courts, which are the traditional arbiters of substantive patent matters,
consistently employ a flexible standards-based approach.52 The USPTO, traditionally tasked with day-to-day administration of the patent system, is much more ruleoriented.53 Thus, given the expansive new grants of power under the AIA, an unchecked
USPTO will result in a more rule-heavy patent system.54 Indeed, a purported goal of
the AIA is to foster inventive activity by providing greater clarity to the patent law, presumably by allowing the USPTO greater latitude to promulgate rules.55
Congress, the USPTO, and the federal courts each play an important role in administering the patent system. However, common law has been the driving force for substantively shaping the patent law.56 Accordingly, judges are the “principle architects”
of patent policy.57 When one considers that the subject matter involved in patent law is
often highly specialized and technical, it may seem odd that judges play the central role
in shaping patent policy.58 Indeed, prior to 1982, regional circuits heard patent appeals
49
See Duffy, supra note 48, at 613–14 (analyzing the failure of historical rules of categorical
patentability but noting the success of patent standards); Nard, supra note 48, at 90–95 (explaining the movement away from “overinclusive” rule of patentability).
50
See Nard, supra note 48, at 72–74 (asserting that Congress’s fear of the Supreme Court’s
patent jurisprudence precluding whole fields of potential innovation was the rationale for the
1952 Act’s use of a standard rather than a rule to evaluate obviousness).
51
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1991); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
308 (1980). These cases each state the policy concerns regarding judicially created exclusions
to patentable subject matter.
52
See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (discussing the need to employ flexible standards
regarding questions of patent eligibility).
53
John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV.
1041, 1047 (2011) (providing the example of the USPTO’s “massive” Manual for Patent
Examining Procedure filled with rules on applying patent-law doctrine to examinations).
54
See id.
55
See Colarulli, supra note 20.
56
See, e.g., Nard, supra note 48, at 68–72 (discussing the respective roles of Congress and
the courts in the development of U.S. patent law).
57
Id. at 54.
58
See Golden, supra note 53, at 1044 (discussing the federal judiciary’s “historic struggles”
with the patent arena and suggesting a lack of “judicial facility” for “resolving problems in
this area”).
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from their respective district courts just as they would most other civil and criminal
cases.59 This arrangement led to disparate treatment of issues such as infringement and
invalidity, as some circuits viewed patents more favorably than others.60 This uneven
treatment fomented great uncertainty in the patent law, compelling Congress to create
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982.61 The CAFC has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent appeals.62 The general consensus is that
consolidating patent appeals to the CAFC has clarified patent law and thereby strengthened patent rights and incentivized innovation.63
Additionally, this consolidation of power came at the expense of USPTO authority.
Since its inception, the CAFC has crafted limitations on the USPTO’s authority regarding policy-setting, substantive rulemaking, and dispute resolution.64 This strong judicial
oversight sets patent law apart from other complex areas where agencies are afforded
more expansive roles.65 Indeed, this delineation has led some to accuse the judiciary of
wrongfully usurping administrative authority from the USPTO instead of merely acting
as a proper check on the executive office.66 In particular, critics question the prohibition on substantive rulemaking by the USPTO and argue that the judicially created
divide between valid procedural rules and invalid substantive rules is unworkable
and baseless.67
In light of these concerns, the USPTO has, with some success, pushed for increased
authority and autonomy.68 In 1999, the Supreme Court first criticized the CAFC’s
constraints on the USPTO in Dickinson v. Zurko.69 Months later, Congress passed
the American Inventors Protection Act,70 which explicitly vested some rulemaking
59

See, e.g., Nard, supra note 48, at 75.
See id.
61
Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 85, 86 (2006).
62
See id.
63
See id. at 112 (commenting on the uniformity that the CAFC brought to the invalidity doctrine).
64
See Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Merck &
Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (holding that the Patent Office “lacks
substantive rulemaking authority”).
65
See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 271 (2007) (noting that
other agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Communications
Commission are given broad discretion due to their complex subject matter, whereas in the arguably more complex field of patent law, the courts reign in the USPTO).
66
See Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1550
(2011); Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76
MO. L. REV. 733, 733 (2011).
67
Tran, supra note 16, at 845–54; see also Tran, supra note 10, at 650.
68
See, e.g., Long, supra note 18, at 1966.
69
527 U.S. 150 (1999) (holding that the American Inventors Protection Act, not the CAFC,
governs the standard of review of USPTO factfinding).
70
American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (1999).
60
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authority with the USPTO.71 Additionally, the USPTO currently practices several
powers that are substantive-like and not clearly procedural.72 For example, the USPTO
has the authority to expedite review of patents that cover technology deemed of
national importance.73 This discretion to prioritize inventions affects more than the
patentee’s procedural rights, as non-expedited patents necessarily spend more time in
the USPTO than they would otherwise. Because the patent term is measured from the
date of filing, this delay in issuance effectively shortens the patent term and thus directly touches the patentee’s substantive rights.
The above discussion illustrates how patent law is by necessity one of the most
fluid areas of the law, but also a field in dire need of greater certainty. The outline of
responsibilities between the Article III courts and the USPTO is particularly cloudy. Far
from clearing the fog, the AIA further clouds the picture by expanding the USPTO’s
authority regarding rulemaking and dispute resolution. Again, uncertainty in patent law
diminishes the incentive to invent because inventors cannot be sure that they will be
adequately protected and rewarded for their efforts.74 It is particularly vital that inventors can predict with some certainty the available forums for defending or asserting
their patent rights, as well as the likelihood of success in a given forum. If inventors can
properly assess the benefits of securing intellectual property protection against the
chance of costly litigation or losing their patent rights in a USPTO proceeding, they
have greater incentive to invent in the first place.75
B. Traditional Reexamination Proceedings and the Strain on the Separation
of Powers
In reexamination proceedings, the USPTO considers the validity of a previously
issued patent. There are two forms of traditional reexamination: inter partes and ex
parte.76 Both forms share threshold requirements and standard of review, the only difference being that the petitioner actively participates in inter partes review but not in ex
parte review.77 A petition for inter partes reexamination can be brought by any third
party who demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood” of prevailing with respect to at least
one of the claims challenged in the request.78 To show invalidity, the challenger is limited to patents and printed publications. There is no discovery, nor any other vestiges
71

Id. § 4711–4712.
Golden, supra note 53, at 1046–47.
73
37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (2006) (containing provisions for expedited patent examination).
74
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 22–29.
75
See id.
76
35 U.S.C. §§ 302–307 (2006) (ex parte review); 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006) (inter
partes review).
77
§§ 302–307 (ex parte review); §§ 311–318 (inter partes review).
78
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). This slightly elevates
the prior standard of “substantial new question of patentability.” 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2006).
72
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of trial practice in reexamination proceedings.79 The patentee can appeal adverse rulings
to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), and thereafter to the CAFC
before estoppel.80
The USPTO has reexamination authority regardless of whether the federal courts
have already ruled as to the validity of the patent.81 Thus, an infringer who has failed
to successfully prove invalidity in the courts may yet succeed before the USPTO.82 On
the surface, reexamination proceedings appear to fly in the face of long-settled separation of powers principles. A fundamental aspect of the tripartite system set up by the
Constitution is the final adjudicative authority of the federal courts.83 Related to this is
the prohibition on the courts issuing mere “advisory opinions” to potential litigants and
coordinate branches of government.84 Further, federal courts have exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over patent matters, including suits relating to infringement and
validity.85 This principle is further solidified by Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,86 where the
Supreme Court stated that “Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III
courts in officials of the executive branch.”87
However, these concerns lay largely dormant in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling
in In re Swanson.88 In Swanson, the Court examined the issue of USPTO reexamination
proceedings subsequent to a challenger’s exhaustion of litigation opportunities in the
federal courts.89 The Court determined that because the USPTO employs a lower standard of review than the federal courts in assessing patent validity, the USPTO is performing a fundamentally different review than the courts even if the attack on validity
is exactly the same in both forums.90 In other words, the federal courts do not declare
patents valid; rather, they merely hold that the party alleging invalidity has failed to
meet his or her burden of proving invalidity via clear and convincing evidence.91 By
this reasoning, if the USPTO reconsiders the question of validity using a preponderance
79

America Invents Act § 6.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 305–306, 314–315 (2006).
81
See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
82
See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 24, at 49; see also In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d
1254, 1257 (2011) (Newman, J., dissenting).
83
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
84
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (Case or Controversy Clause); Rescue Army v. L.A.
Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947) (articulating the policy reasons underlying the Court’s
refusal to issue advisory opinions).
85
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
86
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
87
Id. at 219.
88
540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
89
Id. at 1370–71.
90
Id. at 1377. A finding of patent invalidity by the PTO during reexamination requires only
“a preponderance of the evidence,” a lower showing than the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard required by the federal courts. Id.
91
Id.
80
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of the evidence standard, it does not render the court’s decision as non-final or advisory
and is thus not guilty of violating the separation of powers principle.92 The Court further
determined that because the questions decided by the courts have not necessarily
appeared before the USPTO, the USPTO’s review of a previously adjudicated issue
is within its express statutory authority to consider any “substantial new question
of patentability.”93
Despite the Court’s treatment of the separation of powers issue in Swanson, there
have been significant rumblings as to the constitutionality of reexamination proceedings. When the CAFC considered an otherwise typical appeal of a patent reexamination in In re Construction Equipment Co.,94 Judge Pauline Newman raised this very
question in her dissent.95 Judge Newman stated, “[t]his reexamination appeal raises a
fundamental question—is a final adjudication [upholding a patent’s validity], after trial
and decision in the district court, and appeal and final judgment in the Federal Circuit,
truly final? Or is it an inconsequential detour along the administrative path to a contrary
result?”96 Not surprisingly, the majority relied on Swanson to dismiss this query.97 In
a separate case five months later,98 Judge Newman again raised the question in her
dissent99 and was again countered by the disparate standard of review principle underlying Swanson.100
Although she has thus far been stymied by Swanson, Judge Newman raised this
issue at a timely juncture, as the AIA gives the PTO even more discretion to review
patents that survived prior validity challenges in the federal courts.101 The following
section takes a closer look at the expanded role for the USPTO as contemplated by
the AIA.
C. The New USPTO Powers Under The America Invents Act
The AIA does away with reexaminations, but only in name. In fact, the AIA replaces reexaminations with a broad new post-issuance review framework that vests the
92

Id.
Id. at 1379 (“As properly interpreted a ‘substantial new question of patentability’ refers to
a question which has never been considered by the PTO; thus, a substantial new question can
exist even if a federal court previously considered the question.”).
94
665 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
95
Id. at 1257 (Newman, J., dissenting).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1256 n.3.
98
In re Baxter Int’l, 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
99
Id. at 1366 (Newman, J., dissenting).
100
Id. at 1364.
101
See America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (laying out post-grant review proceedings and the transitional program for covered business
method patents).
93
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USPTO with expansive new responsibilities and seemingly broad latitude to promulgate rules related to those responsibilities.102 Specifically, inter partes reexamination
is replaced by the much broader post-grant review and inter partes review, and ex parte
reexamination is replaced by the analogous ex parte review.103 These third party challenges are handled by the newly created Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).104
Each of these new forms of review is described below, highlighting the USPTO’s new
powers and the corresponding decline of judiciary influence.
Post-grant review and inter partes review together replace inter partes reexamination.105 The two forms of review share many similarities, with the key differences
being timing and the threshold requirements for review.106 In stark contrast to the much
more limited reexamination proceedings, post-grant review and inter partes review are
essentially mini-trials within the USPTO.107 Indeed, the title “Patent Trial and Appeal
Board” belies the quasi-judicial role of the Board. Unlike traditional reexaminations,
post-grant review and inter partes review involve a discovery period.108 The USPTO has
broad discretion to set the terms of this discovery.109 Further, a party seeking post-grant
review is not limited to patents and printed publications and can provide declarations
and expert testimony.110 Estoppel also applies earlier under the new AIA framework.111
Under traditional reexaminations, estoppel only applied after the exhaustion of all possible appeals.112 With post-grant review and inter partes review, estoppel applies after
the PTAB reaches its final decision.113 Ex parte reexamination is replaced by a very
similar ex parte review process.114 However, in contrast to ex parte reexamination, the
new proceeding denies the patentee the right to de novo review by a district court upon
appeal from the USPTO ruling.115
102

Id.
Id.
104
Id. § 7. The PTAB replaces the BPAI.
105
Id. § 6.
106
Id. For post-grant review, the petitioner must show that it is “more likely than not” that a
claim is either unpatentable or else presents a novel or unsettled legal question that is important
to other patents or patent applications. Id. For inter partes review, the petitioner must show that
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one claim or
else the petition must raise a novel or unsettled legal question. Id. Additionally, post-grant review
is only available within nine months of the patent’s issuance, whereas inter partes review only
becomes available after the patent has been issued for at least nine months. Id.
107
Tran, supra note 10, at 631; see also PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 13–30 (2d ed. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2114398.
108
Tran, supra note 10, at 632.
109
Id.
110
America Invents Act § 6.
111
Id.
112
35 U.S.C. § 315 (2006).
113
America Invents Act § 6.
114
Id. § 7.
115
Compare id., with 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006).
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The AIA also creates a transitional post-grant review for certain business method
patents.116 This transitional program is available only for patents that claim “a method
or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in
the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.”117 Socalled “technological inventions” are exempt from this review.118 Further, Congress
tasks the USPTO with creating “regulations for determining whether a patent is for a
technological invention.”119 Although section 18 explicitly states that the AIA does not
grant the USPTO the power to alter standards for patent eligibility,120 the power to
define a class of inventions exempt from post-grant review, in practical effect, comes
dangerously close to doing this.121 Part III of this Note, discussing an approach to judicial review of USPTO actions, uses this specific example to demonstrate the baleful
potential of the USPTO’s new rulemaking authority.
Clearly, the AIA significantly expands the role of the USPTO in determining the
validity of issued patents. As with traditional reexaminations, the USPTO may review
patents that are currently undergoing validity attacks in federal court or have already
survived such attacks.122 But the AIA takes this power even further, as the USPTO’s
new trial-like proceedings and considerable rulemaking discretion seem to mimic and
minimize the role of the federal courts.123 Again, post-grant review and inter partes
review are to be conducted like trials, complete with discovery, declarations, and expert
witnesses.124 Further, the USPTO has discretion to set the rules for these proceedings.125
The tightened estoppel provisions also represent potentially diminished access to
the courts.126
Thus, the expanded role of the USPTO appears to be at the expense of the federal
courts.127 The AIA’s stauncher critics argue that the power shift effectively strips the
federal courts of constitutionally prescribed duties,128 but others insist that a more robust
USPTO is exactly what the patent system needs.129

116

America Invents Act § 18.
Id. § 18(d)(1).
118
Id.
119
Id. § 18(d)(2).
120
Id. § 18(e).
121
Tran, supra note 10, at 631.
122
Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 3–4.
123
Id. at 12–13.
124
See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
125
America Invents Act §§ 6, 18.
126
See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
127
See generally Tran, supra note 10.
128
See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 24, at 50; Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 2.
129
See Tran, supra note 10, at 610 (quoting USPTO Director David Kappos as stating that
the new law will help “accelerate our economic recovery, and ensure[ ] that our nation’s innovators and job creators aren’t held back”).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE POWER SHIFT
A. The Case Against the USPTO’s Expanded Power
The USPTO’s new review powers and broad latitude to promulgate rules has the
potential to poison the patent system.130 There are numerous provisions in the AIA that
seemingly usurp the traditional role of federal courts, leading some to allege that the
law violates separation of powers principles.131 This is more than a mere academic curiosity; critics assert that the expansion of USPTO power at the expense of Article III
courts stacks the deck against patentees, thereby reducing the incentive to invent.132
Further, a more powerful and poorly checked USPTO may lead to compounding inefficiencies within the office, and the pernicious effects of these inefficiencies will pass on
to the rest of the patent system.
1. The New USPTO Authority May Violate the Separation of Powers
Critics of the AIA voice three main separation of powers concerns associated with
the law.133 First, the AIA unconstitutionally authorizes executive review of judicial
decisions.134 Second, the new law disrupts the court’s traditional stay authority.135 Third,
the AIA authorizes administrative tribunals to perform roles that should be accorded to
Article III judges and confers on the USPTO unconstitutionally broad rulemaking authority regarding these roles.136
Any party who has had litigation commenced against them in federal court or is
currently engaged in litigation may seek post-grant review in the USPTO.137 The statutory language covers parties who have lost infringement cases, paid damages, and
have exhausted appeal opportunities.138 By allowing litigants who do not like their prospects in federal court to seek an ostensibly friendlier forum in the USPTO, potential
infringers are given a “real advantage.”139 This is because if the infringer successfully
proves invalidity during post-grant or inter partes review, the case is over.140 However,
130

See generally Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 24; Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24.
See generally Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 24; Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24.
132
See, e.g., Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 1.
133
See generally id.; Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 24.
134
See Cooper & Colatriano, supra note 24, at 50–52.
135
See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 12–13.
136
See id. at 13.
137
See id. at 3–4.
138
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see also Epstein &
Kieff, supra note 24, at 3–4.
139
Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 3.
140
E.g., America Invents Act § 6 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 315(e) (2012));
MENELL ET AL., supra note 107, at 659–60. Estoppel applies after the PTAB renders a final
decision. Id.
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even if the patentee is successful before the USPTO, he or she must return to court
to get a remedy of damages or an injunction.141 Professors Richard Epstein and Scott
Kieff state that “[t]he multiplication of these strategic possibilities thus introduces a
tilt in the system with respect to patents that are subject to litigation.”142 Also of concern is section 18’s lack of a statute of limitations, which allows the losing party to
“get a second bite at the apple so long as the challenged patent has yet to expire.”143
The AIA provides further constitutional concerns pertaining to a litigant’s ability
to seek relief in an Article III court. For example, section 18(b) allows a litigant in a
“civil action alleging infringement of a patent” to seek a stay in order to pursue an
administrative remedy before the USPTO.144 Additionally, section 18(b)(2) strictly
limits the CAFC’s role to reviewing these stay decisions.145 In an infringement suit, this
stay provision inures almost entirely to the benefit of the defendant-infringer.146 In
theory, the ability to seek a stay is available to both parties in an infringement dispute.147
However, in practice, only the defendant has any incentive to request a stay, as the
plaintiff should have every reason to pursue their claim in the courts.148
Additionally, the factors and procedure involved determining whether to grant the
stay under section 18(b) all favor the parties seeking USPTO review.149 First, a petition
for post-grant review should be granted as long as the petitioner demonstrates that
“it is more likely than not that at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition is
unpatentable.”150 If the petitioner meets this slight burden for a single claim, he or she
may bring any additional claims of invalidity before the USPTO, however weak or dismal their chances were in court.151 Courts may therefore be quite liberal in deciding
whether to grant a stay under the AIA.152 Further, the AIA places a heavy burden on the
nonmoving party to show why the petition to stay should not be granted.153 The language of section 18(b) requires the nonmoving party to show “undu[e]” prejudice or
a “clear tactical advantage” for the moving party if the stay is to be granted.154 Thus the
141

Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
143
Id.
144
America Invents Act § 18(b)(1).
145
Id. § 18(b)(2).
146
Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 12–13.
147
America Invents Act § 18(b)(1). The text of section 18(b) draws no distinctions between
the parties. Id.
148
See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 3–4, 12–13. The plaintiff will likely favor the courts
because they have the possibility of a remedy following a favorable ruling. See id.
149
See id. at 12–13.
150
America Invents Act § 6 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 324(a) (2012)).
151
Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 13; see also America Invents Act § 6 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 324(a) (2012)).
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See MENELL ET AL., supra note 107, at 2-48 to 2-49.
153
Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 12–13.
154
America Invents Act § 18(b)(1)(C).
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nonmoving party, who should almost always be the plaintiff-patentee, potentially
faces a huge hurdle to prevent the suit from being stayed in favor of review before
the USPTO.
Critics also decry the dynamics of the new PTAB and argue that administrative
tribunals will perform roles properly accorded to Article III judges.155 This concern
is further compounded by the USPTO’s broad rulemaking authority regarding these
roles.156 The administrative judges of the PTAB are to be appointed by the Secretary of
Commerce, “in consultation” with the USPTO Director.157 The AIA does not require
a confirmation hearing for a lifetime appointment as with Article III judges, nor for a
term appointment as with Article I judges in bankruptcy and tax courts.158 In fact, there
is no statement as to the term for which these judges are appointed.159 Commentators
worry that these judges will deal with only a very small number of cases, or even receive special appointments for a single case.160 Thus, not only is the PTAB arguably
usurping the responsibilities of the Article III courts, but the AIA provides sparse guidance in selecting, assigning, and retaining PTAB judges, which could greatly compromise the quality of post-grant review and inter partes review.161
Additionally, the Act confers numerous far reaching and broadly defined quasijudicial and legislative duties upon the USPTO director.162 In particular, the director has
the power to decide on matters involving discovery,163 joinder of parties,164 and consolidation of proceedings.165 According to Epstein and Kieff:
In effect, the administrator has more power to fashion the rules
for these adjudications than the federal courts have to modify
the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
require Congressional action for major modifications. It is flatly
inconsistent with the American tradition of Separation of powers
to extend to an administrative agency the power that is denied to
the President and the Congress in setting up both Article I and
Article III Courts.166
155

See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 12–13; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at
1659 (arguing that the federal courts are better suited than the USPTO to assess validity).
156
Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 13.
157
America Invents Act § 7.
158
See id.; Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 12.
159
See America Invents Act § 7; Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 12.
160
See, e.g., Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 12.
161
See id. at 13; Burk & Lemley, supra note 37, at 1659.
162
See America Invents Act § 6.
163
Id. (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.A. § 316(a)(5) (2012)).
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Id.
165
Id.
166
Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 13.

630

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:613

This authority thus seems poised to run afoul of the ban on substantive rulemaking by
the USPTO.167 That possibility, and how to guard against it, is thoroughly discussed
throughout the remainder of this Note.
So the AIA contains provisions that arguably run directly counter to the separation
of powers provided by the Constitution, as well as the related ban on substantive rulemaking by the USPTO. Further, the AIA’s provisions may cut so heavily in favor of
the alleged infringer that the practical effect will be the foreclosure to patentees of an
Article III forum in which to pursue their claims.168 Putting aside these constitutional
issues, the USPTO’s glut of new rulemaking responsibility poses serious administrative
concerns, which are discussed in the next section.
2. A More Powerful USPTO May Actually Undercut the Act’s Central Purposes
The USPTO freely admits its dislike of defending its decisions before the courts.169
The purported justification for this aversion is a general lack of resources and a backlog
of applications.170 However, some commentators suggest that this aversion has more to
do with the fact that the federal courts provide a more “level playing field” between the
USPTO and inventors.171 It is therefore interesting that the same USPTO that bemoans
its staffing and workflow issues would simultaneously push for more power.172 The
AIA grants this power, and it is unclear how the currently understaffed USPTO will
juggle the anticipated flood of post-grant review requests while simultaneously implementing the new review procedures and promulgating the rules to govern them. A more
powerful and active USPTO may thus spawn pervasive new inefficiencies even if it
does obviate the inefficiencies of the current regime.
First, the USPTO can expect an initial flood of inter partes review requests, which
will later be supplemented by a flood of post-grant review requests.173 This onslaught
is nearly certain, as review before the USPTO is much cheaper than litigation before the
courts.174 The USPTO proceedings are designed to be relatively speedy,175 but given the
167

See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (articulating the
ban on substantive rulemaking by the USPTO); Tran, supra note 10. Tran argues throughout her
article that the AIA effectively confers substantive rulemaking authority upon the USPTO. Id.
168
See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 13 (explaining that section 18 may deny “the
patent holder the benefit of an Article III (even and [sic] Article I) court in which to defend
its position”).
169
Charles E. Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, How the Senate Patent Reform Bill Would
Abridge the Right of Judicial Review in Patent Reexaminations—and Why It Matters, 3
LANDSLIDE 21, 25 (2010).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See MENELL ET AL., supra note 107, at 4-25 to 4-26.
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See id. at 4-25.
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Id.
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USPTO’s current staffing issues and the plethora of novel responsibilities involved in
these proceedings, a backlog of both application review and post-grant review seems
likely. It may take extensive time for USPTO employees to learn to perform effectively
their new duties. Until such time, the aggregate inefficiency created by this learning
process will further hamper activity in the office. This inefficiency, combined with the
flood of review requests, compounds the troubling potential of expansive USPTO authority. Thus, ironically, the sheer logistical challenge of implementing the new USPTO
powers may undercut the intended purpose of those powers.
The concern deepens when one considers the USPTO’s broad new rulemaking authority, which can potentially multiply this inefficiency.176 Unchecked USPTO rulemaking authority compounds the previously mentioned challenges for employees, as
the avalanche of new rules will continuously redraw the already complex maze of new
powers and proceedings.177 Further, unabated rulemaking by the USPTO will likely
touch the substantive rights of patentees.178 Just one example is the power of the
USPTO to decide what qualifies as a “technological invention” exempt from the transitional post-grant review for business methods.179 Any line drawn by the USPTO will
inevitably lead to controversy, as it will create a class of patentees who feel that their
patents are indeed for technological inventions but are nonetheless excluded by the
USPTO definition. The result will be a host of disgruntled patentees filing suit against
the USPTO, and the USPTO will have to marshal its already thin resources to respond
to these challenges.
Thus, the power shift provided by the AIA may cause deep inefficiencies within
the USPTO. The USPTO will be challenged by the volume of requests for post-grant
and inter partes review, the process of learning how to best administer and structure
these nascent forms of review, and the constant annoyance and expense of having to defend itself in court.
B. The Case for Expanded USPTO Power
Proponents of a strong role for the USPTO readily reconcile this power with the
Constitution and espouse its prudential merit. They argue that critics ignore some important internal checks and limitations on USPTO authority. Likewise, they counter the
main separation of powers concerns described above. Some supporters go even further,
asserting that the USPTO is well-situated to handle its new duties and that this consolidation of power will in fact translate into efficiency and quality gains throughout the
patent system.

176
177
178
179

See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 13.
See id.
See Tran, supra note 10, at 631.
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).

632

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:613

1. The Act Comports with the Separation of Powers
Proponents of the new USPTO power argue that the AIA fully comports with
the Constitution.180 They provide compelling counters to the major separation of
powers concerns,181 as well as justification for the USPTO’s substantive rulemaking authority.182
First, supporters of increased USPTO authority assert that the AIA does not authorize executive review of judicial decisions. Again, the rationalization is based on
Swanson’s “standards-of-review” reasoning:
The Section 6 procedures that govern Section 18 transitional proceedings do not authorize the [PTAB] to re-open final judicial
proceedings. They instead allow an individual to petition for a separate administrative review proceeding in which the Board may
determine, under rules specific to those transitional proceedings,
whether a patent was validly issued in the first place. Although a
“petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability” in such proceedings, that burden, like the burden in
reexamination proceedings, is only “by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Accordingly . . . invalidation would not contravene separation of powers principles by allowing the Board to reopen or
reconsider otherwise final judicial determinations.183
In other words, courts require proof of invalidity by clear and convincing evidence and
thus do not find patents valid, but only that the party alleging invalidity did not carry
their evidentiary burden in proving invalidity before the court.184 Thus, a judicial determination that a patent is not invalid does not indicate that the patent is thereafter infallibly valid; it simply means that the initial USPTO decision was not overcome by a
sufficient evidentiary showing by the party alleging invalidity.185
180

Memorandum from Viet D. Dinh, Partner, Bancroft PLLC, to Financial Services Roundtable (June 20, 2011) [hereinafter Dinh Memo], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues
Patent%20Reform%20PDFS/Constitutional%20Analysis%20Memorandum.pdf.
181
See id. at 3–7; Letter from Michael W. McConnell, Professor, Stanford Law Sch., to
Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., and John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member,
House Judiciary Comm. (June 23, 2011) [hereinafter McConnell Letter], available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform%20PDFS/M%20McConnell.pdf.
182
See Tran, supra note 10, at 650–54 (promoting a model in which the USPTO promulgates
substantive rules in conformity with the plain language of the Patent Act).
183
Dinh Memo, supra note 180, at 6 (citation omitted).
184
See id.
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See id.
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Supporters of increased USPTO authority also argue that the AIA does not interfere with the traditional stay authority of federal courts.186 Notably, the AIA does not
mandate that courts abstain while a transitional or post-grant review proceeding is
pending.187 Instead, the AIA explicitly states that the court “shall decide whether to
enter a stay” while these proceedings are pending.188 The law also does not curtail the
courts’ current discretion as to whether to enter a stay. Indeed, section 18 merely reiterates the same criteria to guide a court’s decision whether to stay judicial proceedings
while reexamination is pending that the courts have long used prior to the AIA.189
Supporters of a broadly endowed USPTO also disagree that the AIA unconstitutionally authorizes non–Article III judges to perform judicial functions.190 First, commentators point out that the Constitution does not “confer on litigants an absolute right
to the plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court.”191 Indeed,
it is well “settled that Congress may employ non–Article III tribunals to adjudicate
disputes involving public rights.”192 Courts have conceded that when Congress confers
a quasi-judicial dispute resolution authority to an executive office, “the danger of encroaching” on the judiciary and violating the separation of powers is minimal when
public rights, and not private rights, are at play.193
The CAFC recognizes patent disputes as matters involving public rights as opposed
to private rights.194 The CAFC reasons that, although patent validity disputes generally
concern disputes between private parties, determining the grant of a valid patent is primarily a matter of public concern.195 This is because the patent right in dispute can only
be conferred by the government.196 Thus, the CAFC’s stance indicates that allowing the
USPTO to establish non–Article III tribunals to reexamine whether a patent was validly
granted does not contravene separation of powers principles. Reiterating the publicprivate dichotomy mentioned above, the CAFC has reasoned that “[t]he reexamination
statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the government, to remedy defective governmental (not private) action, and if need be to remove patents that should never have
186

Id. at 6–7. That is, requiring a showing of undue prejudice and clear tactical disadvantage
is not a new or heightened standard. Id.
187
Id.
188
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
189
Dinh Memo, supra note 180, at 6–7.
190
See, e.g., id. at 4–5 (distinguishing USPTO procedure from Article III judicial functions).
191
Id. at 5 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848
(1986)).
192
Id. (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 853–54).
193
Id. (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 833); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985) (holding that the scope of so-called “public rights” is not limited to
disputes with the government).
194
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
195
Id.
196
Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
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been granted.”197 The court’s holding and reasoning apparently apply regardless of
whether the reexamination was commenced before entry of a final judgment.198
Shifting to the AIA’s effect, commentators argue that the expansive role of the
PTAB regarding post-grant review is constitutional.199 They find support in the fact that
these determinations are themselves subject to judicial review in the CAFC, thus providing an Article III venue for the parties involved in the dispute.200 Further, the AIA
maintains the standard of review that the CAFC has traditionally employed in reviewing
USPTO determinations of patent validity and does not contemplate the greater deference given to the decisions of other executive agencies.201
Finally, supporters of the AIA argue that the USPTO’s broad new rulemaking authority should be embraced.202 They assert that the current regime imposes an unworkable and incomprehensible test that allows the USPTO to enact procedural rules but
deems substantive rules a violation of the separation of powers.203 However, the applicability of this test is in limbo. The procedural-substantive divide was most recently
considered in Tafas v. Doll,204 where a three judge panel produced conflicting opinions
as to what qualifies as a valid procedural rule as opposed to an invalid substantive rule,
and indeed whether the test should be used in the first place.205 Proponents of the AIA
argue that this inconclusive holding cripples the USPTO’s ability to enact needed rules
without fear of sparking litigation, and Congress sought specifically to rectify this problem by granting the USPTO broad rulemaking authority under the AIA.206 Thus, the
vexing Tafas ruling, as well as the legislative purpose of the Act, leads some to believe
that the distinction between procedural and substantive rulemaking can be ignored without any constitutional concern.207 These proponents of broad USPTO power also argue
that unfettered rulemaking power will in fact translate into a more efficient patent system,208 an assertion that is discussed and critiqued over the following several sections.
197

Id.
See Dinh Memo, supra note 180, at 5–6; McConnell Letter, supra note 181, at 1–2.
199
See Dinh Memo, supra note 180, at 7–9.
200
See id. at 8.
201
See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In hearing appeals of
USPTO decisions, the CAFC reviews legal determinations de novo and vets factual findings of
support by substantial evidence. Id. at 1374–75.
202
See Tran, supra note 10, at 650–52; see also Dinh Memo, supra note 180, at 7–9.
203
See Tran, supra note 16, at 845–54.
204
559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
205
Judge Prost broadly classified procedural rules as those that do not “‘foreclose effective
opportunity’ to present patent applications for examination.” Id. at 1356 (quoting JEM Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (1994)). In Judge Rader’s view, the procedural-substantive divide
is a question of degree, where a rule is substantive if it produces substantive effects that are
“sufficiently grave.” Id. at 1369 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted). Judge Bryson simply rejected the procedural-substantive distinction. Id. at 1366
(Bryson, J., concurring).
206
See Tran, supra note 10, at 650.
207
See id. at 650–54.
208
See, e.g., id.
198
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2. Expansive USPTO Power Can Benefit the Entire Patent System
The AIA’s supporters argue the effects of expanded USPTO power will be almost
entirely positive: the federal court dockets will be relieved;209 low-quality patents will
be weeded out;210 the speed of patent application review will increase;211 and the overall
cost of obtaining and defending a patent will fall.212
The cheaper cost of proceeding before the USPTO, as well as the extensive stay
provisions under the AIA, will funnel many patent disputes away from the courts and
into the USPTO.213 Although this diversion may have efficiency costs in the USPTO,214
the corresponding relief to the federal court dockets may offset these losses.215 There
are more subtle potential benefits in addition to docket relief. For instance, proceedings
before the USPTO sharpen the issues for any future litigation.216 This leaner judicial
review should lead to appreciably faster resolution of patent disputes.217 Likewise, the
narrow focus of review aids the factfinder, which should translate into better-informed
decisions, more coherent opinions, and clearer patent doctrine.218 The net effect of this
increase in judicial efficiency and efficacy is to strengthen the patent right, thereby increasing the incentive to invent.219
Supporters of the AIA argue that the new review provisions will help “weed out”
bad patents.220 In fact, the transitional post-grant review of business method patents is
designed specifically for this purpose.221 To many, business method patents are questionable at best, as they teeter on the edge of being unpatentable “abstract ideas.”222 The
AIA’s creation of a specific post-grant review of business method patents allows review
even if the challenge is outside the window for standard post-grant review, and is thus
directly aimed at paring down this unpopular class of patents.223 Further, the lower
209

See, e.g., id. at 629.
See, e.g., id. at 626.
211
See, e.g., id.
212
See, e.g., id.; see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 22–29.
213
See MENELL ET AL., supra note 107, at 4-25 to 4-26.
214
See Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 13.
215
See Tran, supra note 10, at 626–29, 650–54 (arguing that the AIA will provide a net
increase in efficiency of the patent system).
216
See MENELL ET AL., supra note 107, at 4-25 to 4-26.
217
See Tran, supra note 10, at 626.
218
See id.; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 22–29.
219
See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 22–29; Tran, supra note 10, at 660–61.
220
Tran, supra note 10, at 626.
221
See, e.g., Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24.
222
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3251 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring); Ricardo
Bonilla, Comment, A Patented Lie: Analyzing the Worthiness of Business Method Patents After
Bilski v. Kappos, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1285, 1291 (2011).
223
See America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); MENELL ET AL.,
supra note 107, at 654.
210
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standard of review used by the USPTO makes it easier for challengers to successfully
show invalidity of the challenged patent.224 Under the higher “clear and convincing evidence” standard used by the federal courts, “an improperly issued patent will often survive even in the face of significant evidence that the patent should not have issued.
Thus, there are many mistakes that can be corrected only by the PTO—the agency that
erroneously issued the patent in the first place.”225
Supporters of the AIA also argue that the power shift to the USPTO will result
in a reduction of the cost to obtain and defend a patent. Even conceding the potential
inefficiencies inherent in the USPTO’s adoption of novel authority, one can argue that
the gain in judicial efficiency will more than compensate.226 But staunch proponents
of USPTO power dismiss the possibility of these inefficiencies in the first place and
argue that greater power and flexibility will actually translate into increased efficiency
within the USPTO.227 Although the USPTO is currently understaffed and underfunded,
Congress sought to redress these woes with the AIA.228 The USPTO will now have the
power to set its own fees, its operating budget will increase, and funds generated by the
USPTO will go directly back into the office rather than into the nation’s general budget fund.229 Additionally, the USPTO is opening four new regional offices over the
coming years.230 These funding and infrastructure tweaks can allow the USPTO to hire
and train more staff, thereby meeting the demands of the AIA.231
Proponents further argue that there is no fear of unchecked substantive rulemaking
by the USPTO.232 First, the fact that the USPTO has long promulgated substantive-like
rules without shaping substantive patentability standards may imply that the USPTO
will continue this practice under the AIA.233 Likewise, the possibility of suit by dissatisfied patentees may act as a natural check on USPTO rulemaking.234 That is, because the
USPTO will want to avoid the embarrassment and expense of defending itself in court,
it will promulgate rules in a prudent, conservative manner.235 However, the following
section of this Note demonstrates that this self-checking theory is far from airtight.
224

MENELL ET AL., supra note 107, at 654.
McConnell Letter, supra note 181, at 2.
226
See MANELL ET AL., supra note 107, at 4-25 to 4-26; Tran, supra note 10, at 661.
227
See Tran, supra note 10, at 661.
228
Id. at 630–31.
229
Id.
230
Press Release, USPTO, U.S. Commerce Department to Open Four Regional U.S. Patent
Offices that Will Speed Up the Patent Process and Help American Businesses Innovate, Grow,
and Create Jobs (July 2, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-40.jsp.
231
Tran, supra note 10, at 631.
232
Id. at 650–51.
233
Id. at 651–52. But see Wasserman, supra note 18, at 382–83 (asserting that the USPTO
has played a large role in developing substantive patent law standards despite the purported
ban on its substantive rulemaking authority).
234
See Tran, supra note 10, at 658.
235
See id.
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III. A MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO CHECK OVERBROAD
USPTO RULEMAKING UNDER THE AIA
There is no doubt that the AIA shifts responsibility from courts to the USPTO and
alters the availability of those forums to parties in a patent dispute. This expansion of
power strains the already tenuous power divide between the USPTO and the Article III
courts. However, because of stare decisis and current administrative-law framework,
any constitutional challenges to the delegation of post-grant review authority contemplated by the AIA will most likely fail.236 Regardless, these concerns should be kept in
mind during the inevitable interplay between the courts and the USPTO that will determine the contours of authority under the AIA. Although the post-grant provisions
should pass constitutional muster, the text is rife with ambiguity.237 Given the magnitude of the legislation and the importance of patents to our economy,238 the metes and
bounds of USPTO authority under the AIA will be heavily litigated even if the law itself should survive judicial scrutiny.239
Therefore, although the AIA clearly shifts responsibility from the courts to the
USPTO, the courts are in a position to establish the limits of the USPTO’s power under
the Act.240 In other words, by ensuring that the USPTO exercises its new authority in
a manner that comports with the Constitution, stare decisis, and legislative intent, courts
can properly check USPTO authority and preserve the role of the judiciary in the patent
system. Such a judicial backstop can benefit all stakeholders in the patent system, including the USPTO itself.241
The following Parts propose a model of judicial review that will provide this
needed check on USPTO overreaching under the AIA. This approach is aimed at preventing the proliferation of improper substantive rulemaking by the USPTO. The
approach is illustrated through a hypothetical challenge to a USPTO rule and is compared to the alternative of expressly allowing the USPTO substantive rulemaking
authority. This illustration and comparison demonstrates the merits of a strong check
on USPTO rulemaking authority, as well as the numerous dangers of deferring to substantive rulemaking by the USPTO.

236

See, e.g., Dinh Memo, supra note 180, at 2–9; McConnell Letter, supra note 181, at 2.
Jan Wolfe, What Effects Will the America Invents Act Have on U.S. Patent Law?,
LAW.COM (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202514170593
(quoting retired CAFC Judge Paul Michel describing the AIA as “full of ambiguities”).
238
See, e.g., Brief of 37 Law, Business, and Economics Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3–6, 17, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290).
239
Tran, supra note 10, at 611 (stating that the AIA will cause a “raging debate” over the
proper relationship between patent law and administrative law).
240
See id.
241
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 32 (praising the CAFC’s procedural-substantive test in
assessing the validity of USPTO rules).
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A. The Approach: Giving Teeth to the Procedural-Substantive Test
In reviewing challenges to USPTO rules and decisions, the courts should apply a
stricter version of the current procedural-substantive test. Specifically, courts should
employ the standard articulated by Judge Rader in Tafas v. Doll, where a rule is
deemed substantive and struck down if it produces substantive effects that are “sufficiently grave.”242
Again, under the procedural-substantive test, the USPTO may validly enact procedural rules but is barred from enacting substantive rules.243 However this test is heavily
criticized and has even been called “murky and normatively defective.”244 There is
some truth to this complaint, as CAFC judges do not agree on the terms of its applicability,245 and the USPTO has long enacted substantive-like rules.246 This confusion,
combined with the legislative intent to generally expand USPTO authority, leads some
commentators to urge a policy of judicial deference to the USPTO’s substantive rulemaking authority under the AIA.247
However, a far better approach is to apply a stricter version of the proceduralsubstantive test, with the burden on the USPTO to show that a rule is clearly procedural
and does not substantially impact the substantive rights of patentees.248 By strictly vetting any challenged USPTO action for indicia of substantive rulemaking in this way,
the courts provide a firm check on USPTO overreaching, preserve their own role in
deciding substantive matters of patent law and ensure the continued availability of an
Article III forum to parties in a patent dispute. Importantly, this approach is not at odds
with the central purpose of the AIA: namely, to allow the USPTO the necessary authority, including rulemaking authority, to improve patent review and dispute resolution.

242

Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
243
See, e.g, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
244
Tran, supra note 10, at 650.
245
Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1345. The Tafas case produced three separate opinions as to the
applicability of the procedural-substantive test, and these conflicting views have yet to be
resolved. Id.
246
Tran, supra note 10, at 658. Tran points out that under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2), the USPTO
has the authority to designate certain classes of patents for expedited review. Id. at 653; see also
Wasserman, supra note 18, at 382–83.
247
See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 57 (2010) (statement of David Kappos, Director, USPTO) (asserting the efficacy
of maximal USPTO rulemaking authority); Tran, supra note 10, at 626; Letter from Gary Locke,
Sec’y of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, and Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate 3 (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/locke-letter
-oct-05-2009.pdf (arguing that the USPTO should have substantive rulemaking authority).
248
See Miller, supra note 32, at 50–51.
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The remaining sections elucidate this approach to judicial review of USPTO actions
under the AIA. The next Part exhibits this method in action and demonstrates its numerous advantages over the alternative of allowing substantive rulemaking by the
USPTO. Following that discussion, the remaining arguments for the alternative approach are refuted.
B. Illustrating the Approach Through a Hypothetical
The preferred method of applying the procedural-substantive test is well illustrated
through a hypothetical involving one of the many ambiguities stemming from the
USPTO’s broad rulemaking authority.
As mentioned throughout this Note, section 18 of the AIA provides that “technical inventions” are excluded from the special post-grant review of business method
patents.249 Further, the AIA grants the USPTO the authority to enact “regulations for
determining whether a patent is for a technological invention.”250 What exactly constitutes technological inventions is a source of confusion, and the USPTO may therefore
choose to expressly define the term.251 However, this will necessarily create a class of
patentees who are tabbed for post-grant review, but feel that their patents cover technological inventions.252
These disgruntled patentees can challenge the USPTO definition in federal court,
at which point the reviewing court must decide whether the USPTO’s definition
amounts to procedural or substantive rulemaking. This example is particularly interesting because it is not entirely clear to which category this USPTO action belongs. On the
one hand, the USPTO has congressional authority to enact “regulations for determining
whether a patent is for a technological invention,”253 and defining the term will allow
the USPTO to better carry out the process of post-grant review. On the other hand, explicitly defining “technological invention” determines the classes of inventions that are
eligible for the transitional program, thereby directly impacting patentees’ substantive
rights in their intellectual property.254
With that background, one can begin to appreciate the consequences of the court’s
decision. If the court defers to the USPTO’s rulemaking authority, it must either embrace a relaxed interpretation of what constitutes a procedural rule or else expressly
hold that the USPTO has valid substantive rulemaking authority under the AIA. Such
a course entails either adopting Judge Bryson’s rejection of the procedural-substantive
distinction in Tafas 255 or broadening Judge Prost’s holding that rules are procedural so
249
250
251
252
253
254
255

America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
Id. § 18(d)(2).
See, e.g., Tran, supra note 10, at 637.
See id.
America Invents Act § 18(d)(2).
See Tran, supra note 10, at 631.
559 F.3d 1345, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Bryson, J., concurring).
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long as they do not alter substantive standards of patent eligibility.256 By contrast, the
court can adopt Judge Rader’s procedural-substantive test.257 Under that test, the definition may be found to gravely impact the substantive rights of patentees and, therefore,
represent an invalid substantive rule.258 The latter approach is preferable from both a
constitutional and prudential standpoint.259 First, that approach comports with separation
of powers principles, preserves access to Article III courts for patentees, and ensures
would-be patentees strong rights in their intellectual property. Second, this strong check
on USPTO overreaching creates efficiencies that inure to the benefit of all stakeholders
in the patent system. Compared to the alternative, this approach will signal the USPTO
to focus exclusively on the effective administration of its core duties, thereby benefitting every level of the patent system.
Following Judge Rader’s procedural-substantive test from Tafas would ensure
proper separation of powers by affirming and strengthening the ban on substantive
rulemaking by the USPTO. A more deferential review under the AIA eviscerates
the proper separation of powers. Allowing the USPTO free reign to define categories of inventions exempt from post-grant review can easily lead to more and more
substantive-like rulemaking activity.260 Over time, this may allow the USPTO to essentially manipulate or circumvent the patentability and patent-eligibility standards
properly set by Article III courts.261 The approach articulated by Judge Rader and endorsed by this Note effectively guards against this unconstitutional usurpation. Further,
this approach preserves the would-be inventor’s access to an Article III forum and reinforces the incentive to invent. If courts defer to USPTO rulemaking, the unchecked
USPTO will naturally and gradually strengthen its own authority, thereby chipping
away access to an Article III forum.262 Because this scenario is premised on the courts’
deference to the USPTO, patentees have little hope of a favorable decision if they
challenge an overbroad USPTO rule. Thus, unchecked USPTO power stacks the deck
against inventors, creating uncertainty in the strength of patent protection and diminishing the incentive to invent.263 By contrast, paring down USPTO rulemaking and
256

Id. at 1353–54 (majority opinion). A court could not plausibly reach this result through a
wholesale adoption of Prost’s test, as any definition of “technological invention” will necessarily
alter substantive standards of patent eligible subject matter. See Tran, supra note 10, at 631.
257
Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1368 (Bryson, J., concurring).
258
Id. (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Rader’s test, advocated
by this Note, would likely find any overbroad definition of “technological invention” to gravely
impact the substantive rights of patentees, because such a definition will subject a broad class
of patentees to the possibility of losing their patents. See Tran, supra note 10, at 631.
259
See generally Miller, supra note 32 (discussing the merits of the CAFC’s proceduralsubstantive test).
260
See, e.g., Epstein & Kieff, supra note 24, at 13.
261
See Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 473–74 (2011) (suggesting that the USPTO has already played a role in expanding patent-eligible subject matter);
Wasserman, supra note 18, at 382–83.
262
See Wasserman, supra note 18, at 382–83.
263
See id.
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preserving access to Article III courts should strengthen patent protection and incentivize innovation because courts are traditionally a friendlier forum than the USPTO
from the inventor’s perspective.264
Additionally, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the USPTO actually
stands to gain from a judicial approach that places a strong check on its own power.
Specifically, the USPTO can benefit immensely from the clarity provided by this robust
review, as it sends an unambiguous signal to enact only rules that are clearly procedural,
or else risk the embarrassment and inconvenience of having those rules challenged and
overturned.265 Again, this is preferable to the alternative, where the court’s deference
would embolden the USPTO to naturally and gradually assume more responsibility.266
This would have an insidious effect from an administrative efficiency standpoint, as
the USPTO is already understaffed for its current duties.267 Although this deference
rests on a good-faith belief that such leeway is needed to better administer the patent
system,268 an unchecked USPTO may bite off more responsibility than it can chew.269
Allocating already sparse manpower to take on this glut of new responsibilities will
lead to systemic inefficiency in the USPTO and distract employees from performing
their core duties. For one, USPTO employees will need time to figure out how best to
perform their roles and responsibilities under the avalanche of new rules.270 Worse, the
value of patent rights is such that patentees will challenge overbroad USPTO rules regardless of their chance of success,271 and this onslaught of litigation will further divert
resources from the USPTO’s most essential tasks. In contrast, a tight judicial filter on
the USPTO’s substantive rulemaking authority ensures that the USPTO will focus exclusively on those crucial tasks. Compared to a more bloated, quasi-judicial USPTO,
this narrower focus provides efficiencies that can be reallocated to better administering
the patent review process, with benefits passing to the USPTO and all stakeholders in
the patent system.
C. Pitfalls of Deferring to Substantive Rulemaking by the USPTO
The above discussion illustrates that a strict prohibition of substantive rulemaking
by the USPTO is far preferable to an approach that simply defers to the USPTO. Still,
264

See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 37.
See generally Miller, supra note 32.
266
See Long, supra note 18, at 1966 (asserting that the USPTO has long “been vying to gain
more influence” in defining the substantive basis of patent law).
267
See Tran, supra note 10, at 630–31 (discussing the current USPTO staffing and funding woes).
268
See, e.g., id. at 650–61.
269
See Long, supra note 18, at 1966.
270
See Tran, supra note 10, at 630–31.
271
See 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1, at 6 (indicating a rise in patent litigation that is independent of any signals regarding likelihood of success).
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some commentators opine that courts should allow the USPTO substantive rulemaking
authority under the AIA.272 Again, a major criticism of the current procedural-substantive test is that it is “murky and normatively defective,”273 and unduly reigns in the
USPTO. Contrary to the approach advocated by this Note, courts could seemingly eliminate this confusion by simply allowing the USPTO to promulgate substantive rules.274
This Part discusses the purported rationale for that approach and why that rationale
is misguided.
Besides the foreclosure of the vexing procedural-substantive distinction, proponents offer three additional benefits of broad deference to USPTO rulemaking authority. First, granting the USPTO express authority to promulgate substantive rules
does not entail any major change, as the USPTO has long enacted substantive-like
provisions.275 Second, the USPTO can be relied upon to self-regulate its substantive
rulemaking authority as it will naturally wish to minimize the expense and potential
embarrassment of litigation.276 Third, complete deference to the USPTO’s rulemaking authority crystalizes the office’s powers and responsibilities, thereby allowing the
USPTO to more effectively administrate the patent system.277 Each of these arguments is treated below, starting with the fundamentally flawed premise that eliminating the procedural-substantive distinction will actually increase clarity as compared
to Judge Rader’s approach.
It is self-serving and short-sighted to assert that abandoning the procedural-substantive test will eliminate the inherent uncertainty of that distinction. It contributes nothing
to simply argue that eliminating something will obviate the problems surrounding it.
While such a statement is true on its face, it ignores downstream consequences. In the
case of the USPTO rulemaking authority, abandoning the substantive-procedural
distinction may eliminate confusion at this threshold level, but this present clarity is
bought with untold future opacity. Deference to substantive rulemaking authority will
lead to an onslaught of challenges in court, thus spawning multiple areas of active and
unresolved controversy. The resulting doctrine will likely include many tests that are
as “murky and normatively defective” as the current procedural-substantive distinction,
if not more so. Given the choice between the two sources of confusion, it is better to
stick with the known evil and adhere to the procedural-substantive distinction.278
272

See generally Tran, supra note 10.
Id. at 650.
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See id.
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See id. at 651.
276
See id. at 658 (“The surest way for the USPTO to avoid challenges to the substantive
nature of its rules is to promulgate rules that have limited applicability or effect.”).
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See id. at 659–60.
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See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). In this trademark infringement case, the Supreme Court noted that although the distinction between product
design, to which a trademark may not attach, and product packaging, to which a trademark may
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Furthermore, if the courts adopt Judge Rader’s approach and give some needed bite to
this test, the procedural-substantive distinction becomes a clear, unequivocal mandate
for the USPTO to avoid overbroad rulemaking.279 Thus, the assertion that allowing the
USPTO substantive rulemaking authority will increase clarity in the patent system is
fundamentally flawed.
Proponents of USPTO substantive rulemaking authority also argue that the
USPTO’s history of enacting substantive-like rules dispels any concerns regarding
this authority.280 The gist of this argument is that because the USPTO has responsibly
enacted substantive-like rules in the past, it will continue to do this in the future.281 This
assertion is overly optimistic. Most critically, it ignores the onerous cocktail created by
mixing the AIA’s broad grants of power and ambiguous terms with the USPTO’s unchecked authority to promulgate rules according these terms.282 Given this new mixture,
one simply cannot use the past to predict the behavior of the USPTO under the AIA.283
Further, the USPTO has long balked at judicially imposed restraints on its power,284 so
a judicial endorsement of USPTO substantive rulemaking authority would come as an
effective windfall to office administrators. With the backing of both Congress and the
courts, these administrators would have every reason to push this authority to the limit
and no corresponding incentive to exercise discretion and restraint. It is therefore naïve
to suppose that, because the USPTO exercised moderate substantive-like rulemaking
under the current patent regime, it will continue to do so under the broader authority of
the AIA. Again, this problem is avoided by the rigorous approach to judicial review
espoused in this Note.285
The assertion that the USPTO will restrain its substantive rulemaking in order
to minimize controversy and costly litigation is similarly wanting. Indeed, this selfchecking argument fails for analogous reasons as the argument just considered. Again,
the proposition that courts should allow the USPTO substantive rulemaking authority
removes a major check on the power of that agency and implicates a degree of deference to its future rulemaking decisions.286 This deference, combined with unchecked
rulemaking authority, will embolden the USPTO to act as sweepingly as it pleases with
minimum fear of defeat in court.287 Further, even if the USPTO loses isolated challenges, the relaxed stance of the courts should allow the USPTO to enact rules much
279
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faster than they can be challenged. Thus, the USPTO has no incentive to self-regulate
its rulemaking under this deferential model of judicial review. Indeed, given the history
surrounding the interplay of the USPTO and the courts, there is every reason to predict
that the USPTO will fully exploit any leeway granted by the courts.288 By contrast, the
model of judicial review advocated by this Note ensures self-regulation by the USPTO,
as it presents the agency with the easy choice between self-regulation and defeat
in court.
Finally, proponents of unfettered USPTO rulemaking authority argue that the patent
system as a whole is best served by a robust, unrestricted USPTO.289 However, allowing
the USPTO substantive rulemaking authority will lead to far more confusion than it
initially eliminates. Even assuming for the sake of argument that this authority will not
obscure more than it elucidates, this point is still vulnerable on other grounds. The argument rests on the premise that allowing the USPTO to promulgate rules without fear of
judicial overrule will result in efficiency gains within the office.290 However, an attending consequence of unchecked rulemaking by the USPTO is that the USPTO will take
on more and more power through this rulemaking.291 Again, the already understaffed
USPTO will have to find a way to manage this ballooning sphere of administrative
responsibility. Further, discontented patentees will fight tooth and nail against this expanding authority. Even if such challenges face an uphill battle, there will be no shortage of prospective inventors and patentees willing to take up the fight.292 The USPTO
must still expend manpower and resources even if it wins every time. Thus, compared
to a scenario that checks overbroad rulemaking by the USPTO, allowing substantive
rulemaking authority will lead to efficiency losses on at least two fronts: those losses
inherent in grappling with nascent and ever-expanding authority and those losses appurtenant to the inevitable flood of litigation that will accompany this authority.
CONCLUSION
Under the AIA, current administrative tensions in patent law will be magnified by
the USPTO’s unprecedented gains in authority. Many argue that the USPTO’s new
powers amount to an outright violation of the separation of powers provided by the
Constitution. Although these arguments present intriguing merits, they are likely
doomed to failure. However, the courts are in a prime position to reign in USPTO rulemaking authority under the AIA. By requiring the USPTO to bear the burden of showing that a rule is clearly procedural and does not substantially impact the substantive
288
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rights of patentees, the courts can place a firm and necessary check on USPTO rulemaking authority. This model of judicial review will prevent the erosion of the court’s
key role in shaping patent law, and will incentivize inventors by preserving access to
an Article III forum. Further, this approach sends a clear signal to the USPTO to enact
only procedural rules and to operate within the confines of those rules, thereby focusing
the USPTO on its core duties under the AIA. Thus, this approach benefits all stakeholders in the patent system by preserving the constitutional separation of powers,
bolstering the incentive to invent, and fostering efficiency within the USPTO.

